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BOOK REVIEWS
AN AMERICAN JUDGE: Marmaduke Dent of West Virginia. By
John Phillip Reid. New York, New York: New York University
Press. 1968. Pp. xii, 230. $8.50.
Legal history in West Virginia has been badly neglected by both
bar and historians but this book helps to fill in some of the many gaps
in West Virginia's knowledge of her legal past. In addition to the
interest in local history, the author, Professor John Phillip Reid of
New York University School of Law, has employed a technique resulting in a significant contribution to the literature of historical jurisprudence.
Professor Reid's method of allowing Marmaduke Dent and his
chief antagonist, Judge Henry Brannon, to speak for themselves is
perhaps the most important aspect of this book. This is the stuff
of which historical jurisprudence is made. By using the disagreements
of these two "molders of West Virginia law" Professor Reid has
graphically brought forth the conflicts and problems that faced
appellate judges all over the country at the turn of the century.
Judges Dent and Brannon brought into focus some of the conflicting
issues that had disturbed our courts from the days of the first railroad
in New England. Many of these problems of an industrial society
were not settled until after both Dent and Brannon left the bench
but many of their conflicting judicial attitudes, prejudices, and
jurisprudential ideals concerned the problems that faced our
industrial culture at the turn of the century. Professor Reid's method
of bringing these conflicts to light is a distinct contribution to the field
of American legal history and jurisprudence.
It is regrettable that there was not more anecdotal material available to Professor Reid, but little is known about Dent's family or
personal life, for the mountaineers of western Virginia kept little
in the way of records. Dent's great grandfather was the first of the
family to settle in what is now West Virginia in 1776. His grandfather was an unsuccessful doctor; his father an undistinguished
lawyer. Marmaduke Dent was but 13 years old when West Virginia
became a state. He attended West Virginia University and has the
distinction of receiving both the first bachelor's degree and the first
master's degree ever awarded by that institution. After teaching school
for three years he was able to study law under a preceptor, supple-
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menting his income by being deputy clerk of the circuit and county
courts as well as master of chancery, commissioner of accounts, and
notary public. Upon his admission to the bar Dent set up his practice
in Grafton. At the age of 44 he was elected, to the Supreme Court of
Appeals of West Virginia, in 1892.
Professor Reid's description of the West Virginia bar at the turn
of the century, if somewhat unflattering in the light of today's standards, is nevertheless accurate. Undoubtedly the supreme court reached
its lowest point of esteem during the tenure of Dent: it was the lowest
paid court in the nation and perhaps the most overworked; there
were only four members on the bench. (This even number of judges
helped to contribute to its lack of prestige, in that an even split
left the decision of the lower court standing, but did not become a
precedent.) These factors, plus its involvement in the political fights
of the day, made the court the scapegoat of West Virginia politics.
Marmaduke Dent comes alive on the bench as he debates the
problems that faced him and his chief opponent, Henry Brannon.
While Dent is the main subject of this book, we could not have so
vivid a view of him without the counter arguments of Judge Brannon.
They compliment each other in their disagreements. It is unfortunate
that the picture of Dent the man does not come through as clearly as
that of Dent the judge. This, however, is not Professor Reid's fault,
but rather the earlier negligence of the West Virginia bar in failing
to keep adequate biographies of the members of bar and bench.
Some of the legal issues that Marmaduke Dent fought for became
obsolete with time. For example, he was a champion of female
equality under law, opposing inequities which have long since disappeared. Other of his theories would be considered extremely old
fashioned today. Dent was a moralist in a bible belt state at a time
when this philosophy was at its height. This carried over into his
belief that the Ten Commandments were precedents for the common law. He was a legal fundamentalist who tried to incorporate the
tenets of a fire and brimstone theology into jurisprudence. Even in his
day his exercises in judicial textualism were considered extreme. In
this respect Dent was a throwback to the jurisprudence of the New
England Puritans and this moralistic philosophy carried over into
his ideas of criminal justice. His Mosaic interpretation of crimnal
law made him the spokesman for criminal-law classicism of his day.
Dent believed in an eye-for-an-eye and a tooth-for-a-tooth type of
criminal justice that was based upon his Calvinistic faith and his
belief in a God of righteousness and vengeance.
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Dent's most important fight was against corprations in general and
railroad corporations in particular. He strongly believed that corporations should be responsible for any harm they might cause. One of
his favorite techniques to achieve this end was to balance the interests of the parties and, if necessary to achieve justice, to give facts
a greater weight than law. No one could have disagreed more with
him than Judge Henry Brannon.
Dent was the rebel, the lone dissenter, while Brannon stood on
the side of orthodoxy and usually the majority. Together they represented a conflict of many interests. Brannon protected the interests
of corporations with a doctrine of laissez-faire that carried with it
the Darwinian undertones that were then current in American
jurisprudence. Dent, on the other hand, thought corporations existed
by the grace of the public and, as a result, the public was entitled
to their safe operation. He was more interested in the humane aspects
of justice being done. Brannon was rational, legalistic, and narrow
in his approach to the law; Dent was an excellent example of what
the law could be if administered with compassion. In the terminology
of the late Edmond Cahn, Dent had a consumer perspective of law,
while Brannon had an institutional perspective.
Brannon regarded the hardships and injustices inflicted upon
some individuals by the law as part of the risk of living in an industrial
society. Dent, on the other hand, tried to balance the equities between the helpless victim who could not afford the loss and the railroad which could. Professor Reid points out that Dent was not antirailroad in the demagogical sense: he did not discount the economic
benefits that railroads and industrialization had brought to West
Virginia; he only insisted that while the law shielded the railroad
from unjust claims, it should not ignore the just grievances of those
injured by it.
Conversely, Brannon was concerned about the effect of this kind
of holding on the development of the business community. He stressed
the need for protecting the corporations that were opening up the
backwoods-regions of West Virginia, while Dent's question was "opened for whose benefit?"-a question still asked today.
As to which of the two could be considered a success, Professor
Reid concludes that while Dent lost the battles of his day he won
the war in the long run-at least in the light of modern jurisprudence.
Dent's writing style and humor was unique on the American
bench. He wrote in what has been called the Grand Style of common
law opinion writing. His opinions were often written in the finest
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biblical style; a style that served him splendidly as a vehicle for his
native wit. His opinion in Moore v. Mustoe, 47 W. Va. 549, 35 S.E.
871 (igoo) is perhaps a classic work of judicial humor. The opening
sentence is in this biblical style:
This is a suit from the peaceful shades of Randolph County,
instituted by Clara, inter-married with Eli Moore, of Montrose,
against her pa, the Reverend Anthony Mustoe, of Breitz, near
the happy land of Canaan, the neighboring county of Tucker...
He concludes the opinion speaking of the fleshpots of Egypt and
the companionship of poor Lazarus:
If pa is to continue preaching,.., and it is to be hoped, for
from the conduct of this suit and the testimony of the witnesses
Eli is not the only one in need thereof,... he should cultivate
a greater regard for the truth, and try to overcome his lust for
the fleshpots of Egypt. It is bad advice that Stout sent to Eli
to betake himself to a warmer country, and it is not wise for
pa to take it. A rich man, who chose a home there once, sent
back word, when he found the climate was sultry, the air
impregnated with the fumes of brimstone burning, the society
not select, and water scarce and more to be desired than the
gold standard, that he longed for the companionship of poor
Lazarus, to whom he had denied the crumbs that fell from
his sumptuous table .... Rather than accept Stout's advice, it
had been better had he remained in jail until he mastered
the Pilgrim's Progress, and learned how to get rid of the heavy
loads which are preventing the full consecration of himself to
his chosen calling, than which there is none higher. If he is
going to despoil anybody, it should not be those of his own
household. With them, at least, he should be just....
Professor Reid has combined the talents of historian and lawyer in
this book, a feat few writers can do. The picture Reid paints is
historically accurate and as fully documented as possible considering
the lack of both primary and secondary source material. He has
applied praise when due but without overdoing it. But he does
not hesistate to show that there were times when Dent was inconsistent
in his jurisprudential thought. He points out Dent's greatest fault:
his failure as a legal tactician in arguing issues of facts as if
they were questions of law for the judges to decide rather than
demanding that they were questions of fact to be left to a jury. More
important however, Professor Reid has evaluated Marmaduke Dent
in the proper historicial perspective, and not by today's standards.
At this point, the almost inescapable question must arise for most
readers (or at least for those who are not West Virginians). Why
Marmaduke Dent? Why did Professor Reid choose a relatively ob-
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scure judge in what was then the jurisprudential backwaters of the
country to do a major biography? Certainly Marmaduke Dent was
not a Lemuel Shaw of Massachusetts in his influence on American
law. Nor was he a reformer of law as Charles Doe of New Hampshire
or Arthur T. Vanderbilt of New Jersey. Professor Reid answers his
readers' question, as if in anticipation, in the last chapter of the
book. Dent is important because he was typical of the American bench
of his day, and while typical he was also something special and
unique. Dent was an activist, "a doer"; and while he failed to
achieve the miracle reforms that skeptics often demand, and while
many of his crusades were quixotic, he was indeed the fighter of good
fights. Except for his stand on railroads and their responsibility to
the public, the battles he fought were not the great battles, but
rather the little battles that the American bench fought in his time.
Nevertheless, large social problems are usually caused by an accumulation of many small problems-many of them soluble by small scale
activism. The fact is that a democracy needs "doers" at every level, including the judicial. And while the battles he fought were not always
the great ones, a democracy needs to have the small battles fought
also. This is the greatness of Marmaduke Dent. He was a dreamer of
American law and in Professor Reid's terms the "poet of American
law." Perhaps we need more judges like him.
EARL M. CURRY, JR.*

LAW IN A CHANGING AMERICA, THE AMERICAN ASSEMBLY. Edited
by Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr. Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: PrenticeHall. 1968. Pp. xiii, 207. $5.95.
One of the keenest, most skillful, and sucessful lawyers, and
one of whom we have a most illumninating record, was Oedipus the
King. No man could sense a difficulty in the state more quickly or
outline the general problem in legal terms more clearly, and no one
ever pressed a case more brilliantly. In strict lawyer-like manner he
followed up every piece of evidence and drew the logical conclusion:
He was the very one on trial and was guilty. Unfortunately in recent
times Oedipus is more famous for his secret fault than for his obvious
virtues, for he is at least as significant at the conscious level as at
the unconscious level. He shows the pattern that an excellence when
followed all the way through turns back on itself and brings itself
*Associate Professor of Law, University of Richmond Law School.
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into question. Oedipus was never more impressive than when his own
brilliance recognized itself as blind in the face of the dark forces that
shape our destinies. In the dignity of humility he was no longer
king and separated from us but showed any man himself.
In Law in a Changing America, The American Assembly, we can
see the contemporary legal mind exercising its particular excellence
to complete the circuit of inquiry and call itself into question and,
indeed, to put itself on trial. In this inquiry we see specialists in a
movement any man can appreciate. The problem is any man's problem
and so may perhaps be appropriately considered by a non-lawyer.
Not unlike Oedipus the editor of this collection of essays moves
first to consult outside authority. Whereas Oedipus inquired of the
oracle at Delphi and gained some obscure indication of the
problem he faced, the editor here gives us the words of the contemporary seer, a sociologist. In some thirteen pages he manages to
say that it is difficult to predict the future but adds that most likely
the future will be complex and troubled; or rather, "The attempt to
descry the future would be easier were we better equipped with
reliable knowledge of the causes and course of social change" but
surely the future problems will "critically challenge the capacity of
our conflict-resolving mechanisms." Thereafter in the next five essays
some of the most pressing and most difficult problems facing the
country and the legal profession are outlined. Not a single shrill
note is sounded (though in his article "To Secure the Individual
Rights of the Many" Louis Pollak barely stays on pitch at good
middle C) but together these articles clearly cry Crisisl We shall
return in a moment to the particular excellence of these articles. They
are followed by six more which concern themselves primarily with the
kind of training our lawyers now get, the ones who must deal with
these problems. Crisis again: our law schols presently do not offer
the training future lawyers will need. We shall deal with a particular
lack of excellence of some of these articles right now.
When a scientist faces a problem and he has as a purpose
an intelligible arrangement of presently disordered material, he has
typically found a mechanical model useful in arranging the material. This has worked well in the natural sciences and has been
appropriately admired. That his own purpose in this creative effort
is not intelligible in terms of the model he uses need not trouble a
natural scientist. The social scientist has made some headway toward
his purpose of understanding social phenomena by carrying over
as far as he can the method and model of the natural scientist, and
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this has been uneasily admired. For his own activity, and indeed
the social activity of social scientists, does fall within the province of
this science, and yet this purposive behavior is not made intelligible
in terms of the mechanical model chosen to order the phenomena.
The social scientist, however, may postpone attention to that kind
of problem until his own researches force him to face it (perhaps
someday in a book analogous to this one). But now the problems
lawyers face directly involve human purpose, indeed, they arise
from the too forceful manifestation of purposes and their resultant
conflict; moreover, the lawyers' own activity is clearly recognized as
purposive. Finally, one problem the lawyer must face is the training
of lawyers. lWe can sympathize and encourage anyone who undertakes
such a difficult problem, but when he says the solution lies in lawyers'
being trained more like social scientists we may rightly exclaim there
has been serious distraction of thought. At this level of inquiry the
familiar, but apparently not clearly maintained, distinction between
the descriptive and prescriptive, the factual and normative, does not
keep the subject matter neatly arranged, for the inquirer himself is
problematically, but definitely on one side and not the other. In
this way the activity of the authors of the articles in question is more
informative than what they say and speaks against it.
In his article "The Unfulfiilled Promise of Legal Education" Abraham Goldstein speaks of "a conception of legal education that transcends the professional and places law firmly among those social sciences
which search for a body of theory and for a methodology adequate to
test the theories." In further imitation of the sciences Professor Goldstein urges specialization. He says:
It seems apparent to me that the present structure of the
law schools is unsound and that the unsoundness contributes
to the delusion that the lawyer-generalist is competent to deal
with the increasingly complex areas drawn within legal regulation and control. It is time for us to give up the generalist
myth and to develop instead patterns of lawyer specialization
adequate to the need.
Adequate to the need? Who is to decide that? Or better, how
can people be trained to be able to discern what the need is and be
able to meet the need? Is not that rather what training of lawyers
should be oriented towards? Notice that Professor Goldstein himself
faces a problem in his article and then urges as a solution behavior
patterned after the behavioral sciences. But urging such a behavior is
not itself such behavior. Professor Goldstein is trying to solve a problem, an extremely general but not a mythical one, and one of evalua-
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tion and not of description of behavior. He just has not dealt with
the problem very well. In short, his effort, as that of David Caver
in his "Legal Education in Forward-Looking Perspective," shows
directly, but by default, where the problem of legal education lies.
In contrast to this we should notice an article in the first part
of the book. Harry Kalven in his "The Quest for the Middle Range:
Empirical Inquiry and Legal Policy" addresses the problem of the
use of science in the law-making process. He keeps quite clear the
distinction between policy and matters of fact and recognizes "the law
does, and should, embody value judgments that are beyond the reach
of factual impeachment." He adds, "When these profound premises
are involved, there will necessarily be an embarrassing distance between
the premise and any facts modern social science can offer in its support." Professor Kalven traces out the uses and misuses of the
empirical sciences to law in a manner most admirably careful and
attentive to the evidence but equally careful and attentive to a lawyer's purpose. In this article and also in the two following, "Legal
Regulation and Economic Analysis" by William Jones and "Responsible Law-Making in a Technically Specialized Society" by Adam
Yarmolinsky, we can see the authors demonstrating in their own
efforts precisely what they are talking about, the appropriate relationship between science and legal policy, a relationship which is a
judicious evaluation.
In two other articles in the first part of the book the authors turn
to several of the large and urgent social problems themselves. William
Gosset in his article "Balances and Controls in Private Policy and
Decision-Making" examines the extensive concentration of power in
large corporations and labor unions as it relates to public interest, and
Louis Pollak in his article "To Secure the Individual Rights of the
Many" examines the "shabby despotisms" at the fringe of government that increasingly threaten the individual. Even though the
issues are finally of an extremely general nature and invite, if they
do not require, high abstraction, the inquirers never lose sight of
the individual human referent that defines the issues as human problems. The articles show the lawyers' particular excellence not only in
the clear-headed way the problem is analyzed (any disciplined inquiry
should show this much) but in the precision with which the problem
is related to human rights and aspirations (which scientific inquiries
methodically neglect). If a science can be defined as intelligible
clarity appropriateto the subject matter, then there is reason to suggest
a reversal of Professor Goldstein's claim that lawyers should be trained
as social scientists.
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The kind of clarity of purpose of these articles is maintained in
some of the articles in the second part of the book, notably in "Regulating Professional Qualification" by Richard Nahstoll, "The Future of
Continuing Legal Education" by Irving Reichert, and "General Education in Law for Non-Lawyers" by Alex Elson. These efforts give us
good reason to expect that the problems of the legal organization can
be met by the exercise of the lawyer's particular excellence though it
is regrettable that the organization is presently-well, very like other
academic and professional organizations, in part self-stultifying. When
lawyers put themselves on trial the culprit is very like any man, and
yet it is clear they have an excellence that puts them heroically above
average.
And so we should return, not merely in the interest of symmetry,
to Oedipus. But reluctantly. For we would have to speak of a parental
wisdom bringing forth a vigorous and clever understanding that
impetuously kills its father and then as master takes his mother as
subservient wife. But then when all is made clear the mother must
hang herself and the son blind himself. What could these dark movements possibly mean? Who is father, who mother? Who can play
Teiresias and see? No, rather let us see that the vigorous offspring
has much yet to do, and let us be proud the drama is far from
complete.
HARRISON J.

*Professor of Philosophy, Washington and Lee University.

PEMBERTON, JR.*

